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Abstract.  Many philosophers would agree with the claim that the truths reported by the special sciences 
supervene on the ways the world is at the level of the fundamental particles of physics.  At the least this 
supervenience claim denies independent variability for the truths of the special sciences—but many 
would add that the ways the world is, microphysically, generate all the special science truths.  Call this 
“Global Supervenience on Microphysics”.  What it is for a special science claim to be true, says GSM, 
just is for the world to be a certain way microphysically.  But which way?  The popular suggestion is that 
the microphysical truth-condition for a given special-science statement is whatever microphysical 
arrangement it is, that renders true the causal import of the special-science statement.  I argue that there is 
no fact of the matter as to which microphysical arrangement this is, and conclude that GSM may be 
untenable.     
 
 
On p. 171 of Austere Realism, Horgan and Potrč (2007) write, “after all, it is very plausible that 
all truths about the world are supervenient on physics-level truths—that the physically describable facts 
determine all the facts”.  This sort of claim is often made (e.g. Heil 2003, Ch. 5), and is often treated as a 
powerful claim—as saying not just that physicalism holds true for the realm of the mental, but that, quite 
generally, the story of the world told by physics generates all the truths about the ways the world is.  Let 
us call this powerful claim “Global Supervenience on Microphysics”, or GSM.  I argue here that the 
reasoning that often leads philosophers to favor GSM is badly incomplete, and that the position is quite 
possibly untenable. 
 One aspect of any supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variability, and here, I myself 
am inclined to agree, no very elaborate reasoning is necessary to defend GSM.  It does seem intuitively 
plausible that the way the world is, with regard to biology or psychology or sociology or economics, 
could not be different from what it is without there being some difference at the level of the 
microparticles of physics.   
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But theses of supervenience also need to incorporate an explanation of why independent variation 
(in one domain or another) is impossible (Kim 1998, p. 13, Heil 1998, p. 146; Horgan 1993, §8).  GSM in 
particular has a second need as well.  It must say enough to ensure not just that should biological or 
psychological or sociological facts obtain in the world, they necessarily will track the facts of 
microphysics, but further that biological or psychological or sociological facts will occur in the world, 
given that microphysical facts do.   
GSM can meet both needs simultaneously by offering a “nothing buttery” explanation of why 
independent variation is impossible.  This explanation says that what it is for a statement of biology or 
psychology or sociology or economics to be true is “nothing over and above”, “nothing but”, the world’s 
being a certain way at the level of the microparticles.  This explanation does not go so far as to say that 
each individual predicate wielded by the special sciences has, as its semantic value, one or another of the 
properties that are ascribed to the microparticles by microphysics, nor (of course) that the expressions 
used by the special sciences to designate one object or another, that satisfies a special-science predicate, 
pick out unitary items at the level of the microparticles.  That would be a thesis of reduction, not of 
supervenience.  What the explanation does say is that all that there is to being true, for any statement of a 
special science, is the instantiation, by some microparticles or other, of some microphysical properties or 
other.  That is why independent variation is not possible, says the “nothing buttery” explanation.  It is not 
that the statements of the special sciences report states of affairs that have a nature of their own, 
independent from the ways the world is at the level of microphysics, but that substantive laws of nature 
tie the obtaining of these special states of affairs to the ways the world is at the level of microphysics.  No 
such metaphysical “glue” is affirmed by the explanation (cf. Lynch and Glasgow 2003, pp. 210-211; 
Horgan 1993, p. 578).  The claim is rather that statements of the special sciences by nature could not but 
track the ways the world is microphysically—that it is the very nature of these statements to be made true 
or false by how matters stand with the microparticles (Horgan 1993, pp. 581-82; Horgan and Potrč 2007, 
Ch. 3). 
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But each individual claim of a special science must then depend for its truth on the world’s being 
some one particular way at the level of the microparticles.  Can we understand how such statements get 
the particular microphysical truth conditions that they have?  A useful suggestion here is provided by one 
articulation of the “nothing buttery” thesis that is popular among philosophers who think that psychology 
supervenes on microphysics.  This articulation says that the mental properties attributed to persons by 
psychology—in particular, the propositional attitudes attributed by belief/desire psychology—are actually 
higher-order properties.  A person’s having a given mental property M is that person’s having the 
property of having—in virtue of his or her component microparticles—some complex microphysical 
property or other, such that the functional description that psychology associates with M will hold true of 
that person.  The causal profile of the mental property ascribed by psychology is what fixes the truth-
conditions of that ascription, at the level of microphysics. 
But not all proponents of Global Supervenience on Microphysics would be comfortable with the 
claim that all predicates of the special sciences ascribe higher-order properties to objects that are posited 
by the special sciences.  For this way of putting things commits us to saying that there really are such 
objects—that there are persons, for example—and this is a claim that some proponents of GSM are 
inclined to dispute (Horgan and Potrč 2007, Chs. 4, 5, and pp. 181-82; cf. Heil 2003, pp. 53, 190).  
Relatedly, the “higher-order property” idea entails that composition really occurs in the world—cf. 
“component” microparticles—and this too is something that some proponents of GSM question. 
We can salvage what is useful about the “second-order property” idea, while avoiding what is 
questionable, by simply saying this.  Any statement of a special science has some causal import or other.  
What it is for such a claim to be true is, at a first approximation, just for microparticles that occupy the 
volume of the object that the special science posits to have some microphysical properties or other, such 
that the causal import of the special science claim turns out to be true.  Thus consider so simple a claim as 
“there is a dog lying over there”.  At the level of perceptual psychology and animal ethology, one would 
say that the causal import of this claim is the (rather modest) prediction that if persons look in the 
direction indicated, they will have sensory experiences as of a lying dog, and that if a noisy vacuum 
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cleaner is moved into that location, the dog will scurry away, and observers will have sensory experiences 
as of a scurrying dog.  The truth condition of “there is a dog lying over there”, then, will be that in the 
region indicated—and perhaps in other locations, about which more below—there are microparticles that 
are, in the widely used phrase, “dog-wise arranged” (cf. Merricks 2001).  That is, there are microparticles 
that individually have the right microphysical properties, and that are related to one another by the right 
microphysical relations, that the implicit predictions of perceptual and behavioral outcomes will come out 
as true. 
Or consider two other examples.  To say of a person that she wants to drink water predicts that, in 
the right psychological setting, that person will reach for a glass of water if one is placed nearby.  The 
truth condition for this ascription of desire will be (to a first approximation) that microparticles located 
within the person are so arranged, microphysically, that that prediction of a reaching for water will come 
out true.  To say that some gene undergoes a fitness-enhancing mutation is to predict, in the right 
circumstances and with a certain probability, that some phenotypic innovation will be found in offspring 
of the organism in which the gene is located.  The truth condition for this special-science assertion will be 
that microparticles located where the biologist supposes the gene to be have some microphysical 
properties and interrelations or other, such that the prediction of phenotypic alteration will come out true. 
So microphysical truth-conditions are inherited, by a statement made in a special science, as a 
function of which microphysical properties and relations must be present, in the microparticles located at 
a particular location, in order for those microparticles to have the power to bring about some outcome 
predicted by the special-science statement.  But at this point we must remember that the thesis of Global 
Supervenience on Microphysics requires a global “nothing buttery” claim.  If the truth of any statement 
made by a special science is “nothing but”, “nothing over and above”, the world’s being a certain way at 
the level of the microparticles, then the power of certain microparticles to render true a special-science 
prediction of a certain outcome must be “nothing but”, “nothing over and above”, the power of those 
microparticles to bring about some outcome at the level of the microparticles themselves.  In other words, 
for every outcome that lies in the causal import of a statement made by a special science, there must be 
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some state of affairs at the level of the microparticles which exhausts what it is for that outcome to 
occur—some microphysical state of affairs, the obtaining or non-obtaining of which renders true or 
renders false the report that that outcome is occurring. 
It is therefore fair to ask:  just what does it come to, at the level of microparticles, that the report 
“she is reaching for a glass of water” is true—or that “the dog is scurrying away” is true, or “the offspring 
has extra hemoglobin in his blood”?  The first thing one wants to say in response is surely that the truth of 
any of these reports does not come to just one thing—just one sort of state of affairs—at the level of 
microphysics.  Surely there are many, many different ways that microparticles might be so “arranged”—
so characterized by intrinsic properties and so related to one another—that any one of these reports is 
rendered true.  Here is an illustration that will make the point vivid.  Imagine that there is an extremely 
powerful microscope—not just an electron microscope, but a quark microscope, say—that 
instantaneously reveals the microphysical state of every microparticle within a person who is reaching for 
a glass of water.  Then the microscope has revealed one thing that the truth of “she reaches for a glass of 
water” can come to, at the level of microparticles.  Or, at the least, the microscope has revealed most of 
what is involved, at the level of microparticles, in the being-true of that report.  Perhaps the microphysical 
goings-on do not amount to truth for the claim that she reaches for water unless H2O is what is in the 
glass.  In that case we must alter the illustration:  we must say that the microscope takes a snapshot of all 
the microparticles within the person and in her surroundings.  In any case, it seems abundantly clear that 
the next time a token of “she reaches for a glass of water” is true, our microscope will reveal a different 
state of affairs, at the level of the microparticles, that renders the token true. 
Can we imagine that the disjunction of microphysical sufficient conditions, for the truth of tokens 
of “she reaches for a glass of water”, has a finite length—that there is a highly disjunctive sort of 
microphysical event that is not only a sufficient condition for the truth of “she reaches for a glass of 
water”, but that is also a necessary condition?  Let me first explain why the proponent of GSM should 
hope that the answer is Yes.  Then I will say that it is very implausible that the answer is Yes, and that for 
this reason the proponent of GSM has serious trouble. 
 6 
Return again to the global “nothing buttery” thesis.  This says that what it is for any assertion at 
the level of the special sciences to be true is nothing but, nothing over and above, the world’s being a 
certain way with respect to the microparticles.  What this position asserts is a two-fold dependence.  On 
the one hand, the position says that if a statement in the special sciences is true, it is so in virtue of the 
world’s being some way at the level of the microparticles; but on the other hand, the position says that if 
that same statement is false, it is so in virtue of the world’s failing to be some way a the level of the 
microparticles.  In other words:  if, for any statement in the special sciences, there is a truth-condition at 
the level of microphysics, there is some way for the world to be, microphysically, that is necessary for the 
truth of the statement. 
At the same time, there is the point that the statements affirmed in the special sciences include not 
just (what Quine called) “occasion sentences”—statements such as “she is reaching for a glass of water”, 
“the observers are having sensory experiences as of a dog”, “the offspring has extra hemoglobin”—but 
also generalizations.  Psychology might say that any person who desires to drink water will, under such-
and-such circumstances, reach for a glass of water that is placed nearby.  Discussions of perception might 
say that, under normal viewing conditions, any observer who looks in the direction of a dog will have 
doggish sensory experiences.  Genetics might say that any genetic mutations, involving such-and-such 
important genes, will lead either to failures of intrauterine development, or to the presence of phenotypic 
alterations. 
Here is why the point about generalizations matters.  Even if some powerful mind has been 
running our quark microscope for some time, and has taken snapshots of many different microphysical 
sufficient conditions for the truth of “she reaches for a glass of water”, it still can be true that some 
microphysical arrangement in some agent has the power to bring about some microphysical outcome that 
renders true a token of “she reaches for a glass of water”, even though that arrangement does not have the 
power to bring about one of the outcomes of which the microscope has taken a snapshot.  For there to be a 
truth-condition at the level of the microparticles, for a generalization that talks generally about reachings-
for-glasses-of-water—a generalization that says that any person who desires water will, under certain 
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circumstances, reach for a nearby glass of water—there has to be a fact of the matter as to all that a 
reaching-for-water could amount to, at the level of microparticles. 
The proponent of GSM must therefore say that the answer to our earlier question is Yes.  For any 
outcome that lies within the causal import a statement made by a special science, there must be a finite 
and closed disjunction of microphysical states of affairs, that is what it is for reports of that outcome to be 
true. 
But this very position seems highly implausible, from the standpoint of GSM itself.  No 
disjunction of microphysical arrangements actually recorded in the snapshots taken by our quark 
microscope, at all times up to a given point in the world’s history when the special-science reports of the 
outcome have been true, can be counted on to tell us all that that the truth of such reports can amount to, 
at the level of microphysics.  One could indeed suppose that there is a more subtle route by which a finite 
and closed truth-condition, at the level of microphysics, gets determined for special-science reports of the 
relevant outcome.  One could suppose that the outcome reported by these special-science claims has its 
own distinctive nature, and that there is a determinate answer to a certain question of “reverse 
engineering”:  just how might God arrange microparticles, in such a way as to ensure that an outcome 
having just that special nature does occur?  But precisely what the “nothing buttery” claim associated with 
GSM denies is that statements in the special sciences report states of affairs that have their own 
distinctive nature.  On the contrary, says the “nothing buttery” claim:  truth and falsity, for claims in any 
special science, cannot but track ways that the world is at the level of the microparticles, for these 
statements do not report states of affairs distinct in their natures from ways that the world may be at the 
level of the microparticles. 
GSM involves a distinctive “nothing buttery” claim.  Proponents of GSM have not adequately 
asked themselves just how that claim can be articulated and defended.  My own judgement is that it 
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